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Improving population health represents a central objective of the international human rights and development regimes. The right to health is a sine qua non of other human rights. As Shue (1980, 24) contends, "No one can fully, if at all, enjoy any right that is supposedly protected by society if he or she lacks the essentials for a reasonably healthy and active life." Speech freedoms and voting rights mean little to someone who is sick, starving, or on the brink of death. Health is also regarded as both a crucial indicator of human development and a key factor of economic development (Sen 1999) . According to the World Health Organization, health "makes an important contribution to economic progress, as healthy populations live longer, are more productive, and save more." 1 Yet, research casts substantial doubt on the ability of either international human rights law or development assistance to improve health outcomes. Richard recent book, The Twilight of Human Rights Law, epitomizes the prevailing cynicism. Posner draws a parallel between human rights and foreign aid: both, he argues, are motivated by a naïve idealism, and both have utterly failed to achieve their stated objectives. He alleges that "human rights treaty regime [s] can do little to improve the well-being of people around the world" (8) and asserts that "most aid programs are . . . utopian failures" (141). 2 Posner's dour conclusions echo long streams of research in both international relations and development studies. Scholars dismiss human rights treaties as toothless scraps of paper that countries ignore or even deliberately violate (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005, 2007; Hathaway 2002; Hill 2010; Hollyer and Rosendorff 2011; Keith 1999; Vreeland 2008) . Most studies of treaty effects focus on so-called negative rights that proscribe repression, torture, or other forms of state violence. Rather than admonishing states to "do no harm," the right to health compels them to "do good," imposing costly positive obligations that require active intervention. Health spending accounts for nearly 16 percent of all government expenditures worldwide (World Bank 2013) . Given the fiscal burdens associated with securing the right to health, compliance is likely to be difficult for developing countries. This is where aid enters the picture. If resource constraints hinder the implementation of health rights, does aid promote compliance, or is assistance simply too meager-or too ill intentioned-to do any good? Once again, research gives little reason for optimism, as aid fares little better than human rights treaties in empirical studies. At best, scholars dismiss aid as ineffective in achieving such goals as poverty reduction, inequality mitigation, or economic growth (Doucouliagos and Paldam 2009; Rajan and Subramanian 2008; Viterna and Robertson 2015) . At worst, aid is deemed harmful, self-serving, exploitative, or imperialistic (Deaton 2013; Easterly 2006; Frank 1969; Hayter 1971; Moyo 2009; Wimberley 1990 ).
The present study offers a partial challenge to these cynical conclusions. Our analyses examine the effect of membership to a core human rights treaty, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), on population health outcomes in developing countries. We focus on three indicators of health and well-being: infant mortality rates, life expectancy at birth, and daily caloric intake per capita. We further consider whether two forms of aidofficial development assistance (ODA) and development assistance for health (DAH)-enable states to comply with the ICESCR. Finally, we analyze the effects of these factors on between-and within-country variation in health outcomes.
We find that the independent effects of treaty membership and development aid are highly sporadic and, where they exist, substantively modest. Although infant mortality rates among ICESCR parties compare favorably with the rates of nonparties, treaty membership by itself does not improve any of the health conditions we analyze within countries. Likewise, ODA recipients have slightly lower infant mortality rates and higher life expectancies, compared with countries receiving less assistance, but again there are no discernable effects on within-country improvements.
Effects strengthen appreciably, however, when we consider the conjoint effects of ICESCR membership and targeted health aid. Here we find important symbiotic relationships. Our analyses clearly demonstrate that ICESCR membership and DAH receipt combine to reduce infant mortality rates and raise life expectancies. In some cases, treaty membership steers the effects of DAH in different directions (life expectancy), whereas in other cases aid enhances the salutary effects of treaty membership (infant mortality). Just as importantly, these factors improve survival outcomes comparatively, across countries, as well as within countries over time.
These salubrious effects have remained hidden because research on human rights and development tends to operate on separate tracks, with little crossfertilization between the two areas. Analysts who study the health effects of human rights treaties or development aid typically regard them as independent factors, ignoring the dynamic ways in which they combine. Our findings suggest that sociologists and other social scientists should be more attentive to potential synergies between the international human rights and development regimes. Doing so may further belie the sense of skepticism that pervades scholarly appraisals of human rights treaties and development aid.
Health as a Human Right: A Difficult Case of Compliance
The right to the highest attainable standard of health was first articulated internationally in the constitution of the World Health Organization in 1946. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, also declares that "Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care. . . ." And in 1966, the ICESCR was adopted and opened for ratification; upon taking effect a decade later, it gave health rights the force of international law.
The ICESCR is the only UN human rights treaty dedicated exclusively to socioeconomic rights. Among other things, it enshrines the rights to work, to earn fair wages, to form unions, to receive social security, and to be educated. Several provisions also pertain to health rights. Article 12(1) establishes "the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health." More specifically, article 12(2)(a) obligates member states to reduce infant mortality and promote the healthy development of children. Article 11(1) recognizes the "right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food," and article 11 (2) asserts the "fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger."
These guarantees are costly and pose a difficult test of compliance. Heath rights presuppose extensive infrastructural and service-delivery capabilities. To implement the ICESCR's health-related provisions, countries must construct and maintain sanitation systems, build hospitals and clinics, distribute food and medicines, train and regulate clinicians, and so on. Yet even human rights treaties that simply mandate government inaction or noninterference are often "loosely coupled" with and even "radically decoupled" from subsequent practices, with treaty membership showing null or even negative effects (Clark 2010; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005) . Formal promises not to torture, for example, fail to prevent states from abusing their citizens (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007; Hathaway 2002; Hill 2010; Hollyer and Rosendorff 2011; Keith 1999) . Burton 2005, 597) . Likewise, favorable human rights practices are thought to reflect a "government's willingness to respect the human rights of its citizens" (Cingranelli and Richards 1999, 511) . In this view, the decision to respect or violate human rights is just that-a conscious and purposive choice. Noncompliance represents a problem of enforcement: in the absence of effective monitoring and credible sanctions, human rights treaties are largely impotent (von Stein 2015). As Thomas Hobbes (1985, 223) declared long ago, "Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words." Such a view neglects that some rights depend as much on financial or institutional capacity as political will for compliance. Treaties addressing complex or costly outcomes take time to implement, particularly for developing countries (Chayes and Chayes 1993; Cole 2015a; Craven 1995; Gauri 2011) . The ineffectiveness of the ICESCR may stem not from willful disobedience, but rather from another kind of decoupling-between means and ends (Bromley and Powell 2012) . In the realm of health rights, we might modify Hobbes's sentiment to suggest that ratification of the ICESCR, without the checkbook, is but an empty promise.
Because many socioeconomic rights are difficult to implement, the ICESCR establishes a less onerous standard of compliance relative to other human rights treaties. Article 2(1) calls on state parties to "take steps. . . to the maximum of [their] available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures." This provision acknowledges that many of the rights guaranteed by the ICESCR-including the right to health-are not amenable to immediate enforcement, particularly for developing countries Dennis and Stewart 2004; Roth 2004) .
If nothing else, article 2(1) instructs countries to enact legislation as an indicator of compliance, on the assumption that laws are easier to pass than substantive outcomes are to improve. Although some two-thirds of countries have constitutionalized the right to health or health care in some manner (Kinney and Clark 2004) , vast disparities in these outcomes persist.
From Each According to Ability: Extraterritorial Obligations
How, then, can international human rights law promote health and well-being? If the ICESCR relaxes treaty obligations with respect to developing countries, article 2(1) imposes "extraterritorial obligations" on wealthy countries to assist their less affluent counterparts (Skogly and Gibney 2007) . Developed states must render "international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical," to developing countries. Thus, even though pessimism over the ICESCR's efficacy seems warranted, it remains possible that financial assistance enhances the ability of less-developed countries to comply with the covenant.
Assistance and cooperation assume many forms. The Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights Committee, a body of international experts that monitors compliance with the ICESCR, advises states to refrain from imposing embargoes that would restrict the supply of food, medicines, or medical equipment to countries in need (Skogly and Gibney 2007) . The committee also recognizes the need for proactive assistance. In 1970, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution recommending that "economically advanced" countries spend 0.7 percent of their national incomes on ODA (OECD 2016). Since then, the Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights Committee has reprimanded states that fall short of this target:
• "The Committee notes with concern that in 1999 Finland devoted only 0.32 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to international cooperation, while the United Nations recommendation in this regard is 0.7 percent of GDP for industrialized countries." • "The Committee regrets that. . . the State party [Germany] devoted 0.26 percent of its GNP to official development assistance (ODA) in 1998, well below the target goal of 0.7 percent set by the United Nations." • "The Committee regrets that Iceland devotes only 0.16 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) to international cooperation, while the United Nations recommendation in this regard is 0.7 percent for developed countries." 4 These examples, which we could multiply, appear in concluding observations issued by the Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights Committee after it reviews mandatory compliance reports submitted by parties to the ICESCR. To the extent that development aid boosts a target state's institutional capacity (Gisselquist 2014) , it may also promote compliance with the ICESCR. Aid's effectiveness, however, is vigorously debated. For every study concluding that "aid contributes powerfully to ... human development" (Kosack and Tobin 2006, 205) , another declares just as emphatically that "foreign aid is ineffective at increasing overall health and is an unsuccessful human development tool" (Williamson 2008, 188) . There is little empirical consensus on the matter.
Theories also advance contradictory predictions regarding aid effects. Sociologists and economists, in particular, tend to view aid from very different vantage points. Dependency theories in sociology contend that reliance on external aid inhibits development and harms well-being. Such approaches regard aid as an instrument of unequal power relations that distorts growth, undermines capacity, exacerbates inequality, serves donor rather than recipient interests, and lines the pockets of autocrats (Bornschier, Chase-Dunn, and Rubinson 1978; Goldsmith 2001; Ndulu and O'Connell 1999) . Frank (1969) argues that foreign aid perpetuates recipient countries' dependence on, acquiescence to, and exploitation by donors. Bornschier and colleagues (1978) similarly worry that foreign aid creates "control structures" whereby donors exert undue and often nefarious influence on recipient countries. Echoing these concerns, Wimberley (1990, 78) alleges that "dependence on foreign aid may encourage governments to promote the interests of the aid 'donor' and neglect the disprivileged."
People working from these premises are therefore baffled-and perhaps also relieved-to find that "the effects of dependence [on health] are hard to find" (Firebaugh and Beck 1994, 648) . For instance, when Wimberley (1990) failed to establish any systematic effect of aid on infant mortality or life expectancy in developing countries, he strained to offer a reason: after all, he insisted, "it is unlikely that all arguments about aid's [negative] effects are incorrect" (81).
Unlike sociologists, economists often assume that foreign aid will stimulate economic growth and improve aggregate well-being. Yet they, too, find that aid has little or no effect on social or economic outcomes. According to Radelet (2015, 413) , "there is little doubt that aid has been less effective in spurring development than is often expected." As the authors of an extensive metaanalysis put it, the "sad results of 40 years of research" are that aid has not mitigated poverty in developing countries, despite the best of intentions (Doucouliagos and Paldam 2009, 434) . These findings do not bode well for population health, given the strong link between economic and physical well-being (Firebaugh and Beck 1994; Houweling et al. 2005; Preston 1975; Pritchett and Summers 1996; Wickrama and Mulford 1996) .
Research on the health effects of aid offers mixed results. Easterly (2006, 176) criticizes the ineffectiveness and even perversity of aid in general, but concedes that it "likely contributed" to improved health outcomes such as lower infant mortality rates and rising life expectancies in developing countries. Health outcomes are exceptional, he argues, because they are relatively easy to observe and measure.
Other studies report substantively small and statistically fragile effects of ODA on health outcomes. As ODA increases, some research finds that infant and child mortality rates decrease slightly, but these effects are highly sensitive to alternative estimators, model specifications, and country subsamples (Gomanee et al. 2005; Mishra and Newhouse 2009; Winkleman and Adams 2017) . Another study concludes that ODA has no effect on child mortality or life expectancy (Mishra and Newhouse 2009 ). Yet another analysis finds that infant mortality rates actually increase with ODA (Boone 1996) , lending at least some credence to aid pessimism.
Equivocal results also characterize the impact of targeted health aid. On the one hand, neither Williamson (2008) nor Wilson (2011) finds a relationship between DAH and infant mortality rates or life expectancies in developing countries. On the other hand, Bendavid and Bhattacharya (2014) conclude that DAH improves child mortality rates and life expectancies, especially since 2000.
Foreign aid may be more effective when recipient countries are democratic, according to recent research. On its own, democracy has an ambiguous effect on health outcomes. It has little or no impact on infant and child mortality rates (Gerring, Thacker, and Alfaro 2012; Ross 2006) , although it may be associated with higher life expectancies (Besley and Kudamatsu 2006) and greater caloric consumption (Blaydes and Kayser 2011) . reports that multilateral and bilateral aid is associated with a higher quality of life in democratic countries, but that aid has a negative effect in countries ruled by autocratic regimes. 5 Thus, in Kosack's study, democracy is decisive in determining whether aid promotes or thwarts human development outcomes.
Our analysis considers whether international political and normative factors play a similarly decisive role. Does a country's legal commitment to the ICESCR condition the health effects of development aid, steering it in positive directions? Correlatively, does aid make compliance with the ICESCR's health provisions more feasible and hence more likely?
Hypotheses: Human Rights, Aid, and Well-Being Table 1 draws on existing theoretical arguments and empirical findings to formulate six distinct hypotheses for the effects of ICESCR membership and development aid on health outcomes. Consider, first, the independent effect of ICESCR membership. Although we argue that the ICESCR's costly health-related provisions will be difficult for developing countries to implement, recent studies conclude that ICESCR membership independently increases school enrollments and child immunization rates (Boyle and Kim 2009) , improves labor rights practices (Cole 2013) , and reduces income inequality (Cole 2015b) . We thus consider whether ICESCR membership similarly improves health outcomes (Hypothesis 1).
As a counterpoint to this hypothesis, much theory and research doubts the ICESCR's efficacy. A recent correlational analysis found no relationship between membership in six prominent human rights treaties, including the ICESCR, and health outcomes such as infant mortality, child mortality, and life expectancy (Palmer et al. 2009 ). That study, however, did not attempt to isolate the ICESCR's unique effects. Theoretical perspectives that regard noncompliance as an enforcement problem, rather than a problem of capacity, also expect human rights treaties to be ineffective (Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Cole 2015a; Hafner-Burton 2005; von Stein 2015) . The ICESCR was given weak enforcement mechanisms by design, owing to the difficulties involved with its implementation (Cole 2013, 168-69) . For these reasons, an alternative hypothesis posits that ICESCR membership will not independently affect health outcomes (Hypothesis 2).
As with ICESCR membership, theory and research motivate competing expectations for the health effects of development aid. On the one hand, even scholars who deride foreign aid as ineffective nevertheless concede that development assistance often improves health outcomes (Easterly 2006; Radelet 2015) , and several studies report positive but tenuous aid effects (Bendavid and Bhattacharya 2014; Gomanee et al. 2005; Mishra and Newhouse 2009; Winkleman and Adams 2017) . We might therefore expect development aid to improve health outcomes, independently of ICESCR membership and other factors (Hypothesis 3).
On the other hand, dependency theories argue, and much empirical research concludes, that aid is ineffective at best or destructive at worst (Boone 1996; Bornschier, Chase-Dunn, and Rubinson 1978; Deaton 2013; Doucouliagos and Paldam 2009; Frank 1969; Goldsmith 2001; Hayter 1971; Moyo 2009; Ndulu and O'Connell 1999; Williamson 2008; Wilson 2011; Wimberley 1990 ). Here, the expectation is that aid will not improve health outcomes (Hypothesis 4).
A final set of hypotheses posit the mutually conditional effects of human rights treaties and development aid. Countries that combine treaty membership with external assistance may experience improvements in population health. Keith 1999) . Human rights treaties appear to be ineffective for health outcomes as well (Palmer et al. 2009 ). Hypothesis 2: ICESCR membership will have no independent effect on health outcomes.
Dependency theories argue, and much empirical research finds, that aid is ineffective at best or destructive at worst. Reliance on aid inhibits development and harms well-being (Boone 1996; Bornschier et al. 1978; Deaton 2013; Doucouliagos and Paldam 2009; Frank 1969; Goldsmith 2001; Hayter 1971; Moyo 2009; Ndulu and O'Connell 1999; Williamson 2008; Wilson 2011; Wimberley 1990 ). Hypothesis 4: Aid will have no independent effect on health outcomes.
Improved health outcomes: Conditional effects
Human rights treaties are effective under specified conditions; a state's capacity to comply is one of those conditions (Bromley and Powell 2012; Chayes and Chayes 1993; Cole 2015a; Craven 1995; Gauri 2011) . If development aid boosts a target state's capacity (Gisselquist 2014) , it may therefore promote compliance with the ICESCR. Hypothesis 5: The positive effect of ICESCR membership on health outcomes is conditional on development aid ("aid activates treaty effects"). finds that aid has no independent effect on health outcomes, but its effect when conditioned on democracy is positive. We consider whether ICESCR membership similarly activates or enhances the positive effects of aid. If development aid improves a state's ability to improve health outcomes, ICESCR membership signals its commitment to doing so. Hypothesis 6: Aid will improve health outcomes in conjunction with ICESCR membership ("treaties activate aid effects").
Our first conditional hypothesis views implementation of the ICESCR's health rights as a problem of capacity rather than enforcement. If development aid enhances a target country's institutional and infrastructural capacity (Gisselquist 2014) , it may promote compliance with the ICESCR. We consider whether the effect of ICESCR membership is conditional on development aid, such that the more aid a country receives, the more likely ICESCR membership is to improve health outcomes (Hypothesis 5). According to this hypothesis, development aid "activates" treaty effects.
It is also possible that membership to the ICESCR channels the effects of development aid in different directions, much as democracy appears to condition the effects of aid on health outcomes. If aid enhances a state's capacity to improve health outcomes, ratification of the ICESCR signals its commitment to doing so (Cingranelli and Richards 2007) . We examine whether development aid improves health outcomes in conjunction with ICESCR membership (Hypothesis 6). In this case, treaty membership "activates" the effect of aid.
We also evaluate the effect of different types of aid-official development aid as well as targeted health aid-on health outcomes. ODA seeks to promote economic development and welfare in a variety of domains, including education, governance, social services, economic infrastructure and production, and humanitarian crises. Some ODA also goes toward debt relief. Only a fraction of total ODA-between 0.5 and 7 percent, according to recent estimates-supports health care (Mishra and Newhouse 2009, 859) . Nevertheless, even if development aid is not earmarked for health-related purposes, it can improve health outcomes indirectly by relaxing budget constraints, easing financial burdens, and increasing overall infrastructural capacities (Kosack and Tobin 2006; Mishra and Newhouse 2009) .
A second type of aid, DAH, targets health outcomes directly. Mishra and Newhouse (2009, 863) surmise that "aid given specifically for health purposes should have a larger effect on health outcomes than overall aid." Wolf (2007) , who analyzed the effects of both overall ODA and health-related assistance, finds that the former actually increases infant and child mortality rates, whereas the latter reduces child but not infant mortality rates. She concludes that targeted health aid is more effective than overall development aid. We treat the matter as an open question to be investigated in our analysis.
We estimate the effects of ICESCR membership, ODA, and DAH on variation in health outcomes across countries as well as within countries over time. Do countries that belong to the ICESCR (or that receive more aid) enjoy better outcomes, compared with countries that have not ratified the covenant (or that receive less or no aid)? Does a country's own health profile improve following treaty membership or aid receipt? Both comparisons are important, and researchers should be attentive to each (Brady, Beckfield, and Zhao 2007; Brady, Kaya, and Beckfield 2007) . Our analyses attempt to disentangle these effects.
Finally, we analyze the effects of ICESCR membership and development aid on three benchmarks of population health: infant mortality rates, life expectancy at birth, and caloric intake. These outcomes tap different aspects of a country's overall population health profile and are thought to reflect distinct patterns of well-being in a society. Infant mortality rates are typically highest among impoverished or disadvantaged populations, per capita caloric intake is more likely to be skewed toward affluent groups, and life expectancy appears to track well-being of the population as a whole (Brady, Kaya, and Beckfield 2007; Jenkins and Scanlan 2001) .
Research Design
We use a two-pronged analytic strategy to evaluate these hypotheses. First, we assess the independent effects of ICESCR membership and development assistance, both ODA and DAH, on developing countries' population health outcomes. Second, we examine whether development assistance and ICESCR membership combine to improve these outcomes. We define developing countries as those that do not belong to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
Dependent Variables
As noted, we analyze three indicators of population health. Infant mortality rates measure the number of infants who die by age one per 1,000 live births. Life expectancy at birth refers to the average number of years a person is expected to live if mortality patterns at the time of birth remain constant. Caloric intake, a measure of food consumption, is expressed in daily calories per capita. Data for infant mortality and life expectancy come from the World Development Indicators database (World Bank 2013), and caloric intake is sourced from the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (2014). Apodaca (2007, 177) suggests that basic health outcomes such as infant mortality rates and life expectancy represent "key measures" for testing compliance with the ICESCR's obligations. 6 
Independent Variables
Party to ICESCR Our first independent variable is a binary indicator denoting whether a country is party to the ICESCR, coded 1 after a country ratified the covenant and 0 beforehand. Ratification includes succession, whereby a state agrees to remain bound by a treaty commitment undertaken by its predecessor-as when the Czech Republic formally succeeded Czechoslovakia's membership to the ICESCR. The analyses do not consider signature, which does not create a legally binding commitment. Information on dates of ratification comes from the United Nations' "Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard." 7 Figure 1 plots the share of non-OECD countries that belong to the ICESCR over time. Membership increased steadily until the early 1990s: between 1970 and 1993, the ICESCR added nearly five additional non-OECD parties, on average, per year. The membership rate continued to increase after 1993, albeit at a somewhat slower pace of roughly two additional countries per year. By the end of our observation period, some 80 percent of developing countries had ratified the ICESCR. The handful of states that have yet to ratify are scattered across sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.
Official development assistance (ODA) ODA, expressed in per capita terms, comes from the World Bank's (2013) World Development Indicators database. Data on ODA are available for the entire observation period (i.e., 1970 to 2012) . ODA consists of grants and loans made on concessional terms by official agencies of the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, by multilateral institutions, and by non-DAC countries to promote economic development and welfare. Loan terms are "concessional" when they are substantially more generous than market loans, either because interest rates are below the market average or because grace periods are longer than normal. ODA includes loans with a grant element of at least 25 percent.
Development assistance for health (DAH)
Our second aid measure, DAH, focuses on health-related assistance. We obtained this measure from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation's Development Assistance for Health Database (Dieleman et al. 2016 ; Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 2016), which includes data on the total amount of DAH received annually, by country, from 1990 onward. The DAH analyses therefore cover a shorter period than the ODA analyses.
DAH addresses a variety of health-related issues ranging from child health, nutrition, and vaccination; HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, and support; 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 ICESCR membership rate maternal health and family planning; health support systems for malaria, tuberculosis, and other communicable diseases; mental health programs; and tobacco cessation initiatives. The database reports total DAH received in constant 2015 US dollars; we deflated it to 2005 dollars (for comparability with our variable for economic development, below) and measured it in per capita terms.
Control Variables
We include a parsimonious set of controls to maximize the temporal and crossnational coverage of our sample. The first control variable, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, is expressed in constant 2005 US dollars and logged to reduce skew (World Bank 2013). GDP per capita serves to proxy economic development, and its inclusion is motived by the well-established link between wealth and health (Firebaugh and Beck 1994; Houweling et al. 2005; Preston 1975; Pritchett and Summers 1996; Wickrama and Mulford 1996) . A measure of human capital, gross secondary enrollment ratio, expresses total enrollment in secondary education, regardless of age, as a percentage of the population of official secondary education age (World Bank 2013). This variable accounts for the "well known, large, and persistent association between education and health" (Cutler and Lleras-Muney 2006, 1) .
Fertility rate is the number of children that would be born to a woman, were she to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with age-specific fertility rates (World Bank 2013). Fertility rates are associated with higher infant mortality rates, lower overall life expectancies, and fewer calories consumed (Brady, Beckfield, and Zhao 2007) .
We include a standard index of democracy from the Polity IV database (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2017), on the basis of research that examinesand at times establishes-a link between democracy and health outcomes (Besley and Kudamatsu 2006; Blaydes and Kayser 2011; Gerring, Thacker, and Alfaro 2012; Jenkins and Scanlan 2001; Miller 2015; Ross 2006 ). This index varies from −10 (most autocratic) to +10 (most democratic).
To account for the negative health effects of warfare, we include two ordinal measures of conflict from the Major Episodes of Political Violence dataset (Marshall 2015) . In our sample, civil war intensity ranges from 0 (no civil warfare) to 6 (extensive civil warfare; e.g., Bosnia between 1992 and 1995), and international war intensity ranges from 0 (no international warfare) to 7 (pervasive international warfare; e.g., Vietnam during the Vietnam War).
Finally, an indicator for sub-Saharan African countries accounts for high levels of disease-related mortality (especially from AIDS) in that region. 8 
Methods
We conduct analyses using two estimators. First, we use pooled ordinary-least squares (OLS) with significance tests based on Driscoll-Kraay standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Driscoll and Kraay 1998; Newey and West 1994) . 9 To account for any secular trends in our data, these analyses include linear time as an additional control variable. Second, we estimate two-way fixed-effects models that correct for first-order autocorrelation. 10 Country fixed effects control for all durable but unmeasured country characteristics, discarding cross-sectional differences across countries in favor of analyzing variation within countries over time. Year-specific intercepts account for global changes and secular trends in health conditions. Our sample sizes fluctuate for two reasons. First, analyses using ODA include more observations than the DAH analyses, because data for the former are available from 1970 whereas coverage for the latter begins in 1990. Sample sizes also vary according to the estimator employed. Fixed-effects models drop the first observation of each panel when implementing the first-order autocorrelation transformation (StataCorp 2013, 406) . The ODA sample comprises 2,625 country-year observations spread across 108 non-OECD countries, with an average record length of 24 years. The corresponding fixed-effects sample includes 2,517 observations for 106 countries (two countries, Jamaica and Kuwait, contribute only one observation each and therefore do not appear in the fixed-effects analyses). The DAH sample encompasses 1,559 country-year observations for 111 non-OECD countries, with an average record length of 14 years. The corresponding fixed-effects sample includes 1,448 observations and 109 countries (as before, two countries-Jamaica and the Czech Republic-are singleton cases and drop out of the analyses). The appendix lists the countries that appear in each sample.
Selection and simultaneity biases may inhibit our efforts to estimate causal relationships using observational data. Decisions to join a human rights treaty may be endogenous to the outcomes it seeks to improve. Some analysts theorize that rights-abusing countries ratify human rights treaties at higher-thanexpected rates in a bid to acquire legitimacy, deflect external criticism, or mollify domestic opposition (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005, 2007; Hathaway 2003; Vreeland 2008) . Others contend that the propensity to ratify is greatest among "least-cost compliers"-countries whose practices already conform to treaty provisions (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996; Hathaway 2002; Simmons 2009; von Stein 2005) .
A related concern is that a country's health conditions will influence the amount of ODA and DAH it receives. As with treaty ratification, it is difficult to anticipate the direction of these potential biases. Mishra and Newhouse (2009, 861) assume that assistance targets the neediest countries, such that "more aid flows to countries when health indicators are worsening." If aid is endogenous to health in this manner, then countries with higher infant mortality rates, shorter life expectancies, and diminished food consumption will receive more aid. Conversely, Wilson (2011 Wilson ( , 2032 reports that "reductions in mortality lead to large and significant increases in incoming DAH flows," such that health improvements are a cause rather than a consequence of aid flows.
To address these issues, we conduct extensive robustness checks and diagnostic tests, which we report in the accompanying methodological appendix. We present the results of event history analyses of ICESCR ratification, regression models of unobservable selection into the ICESCR, Granger-causality analyses of development assistance and health outcomes, and endogeneity tests using instrumental variables for development assistance. These analyses provide strong evidence against the presence of selection effects and endogeneity bias. The appendix further demonstrates that our results are robust to changes in sample composition as well as to the exclusion of outliers with respect to development assistance. Table 2 presents pooled OLS estimates for the effect of ICESCR membership, ODA per capita, and control variables on infant mortality rates (models 1 and 2), life expectancy at birth (models 3 and 4), and daily calories per capita (models 5 and 6). For each outcome, the first model analyzes the independent effects of ICESCR membership and ODA, and the second model incorporates interaction terms between these two variables.
Results

ICESCR Membership and Official Development Assistance
In these analyses, ICESCR membership is associated with lower infant mortality rates, and ODA improves both infant mortality and life expectancy. The regression-adjusted infant mortality rate for ICESCR parties in model 1 is 8.27 deaths per 1,000 births lower than the rate for nonparties. This effect translates into roughly 9,700 fewer infant deaths. 11 ODA also reduces infant mortality rates, although the effect is modest. Increasing ODA per capita by $1 corresponds to roughly 70 fewer infant deaths, according to the estimate in model 1. Across the interquartile range of ODA (i.e., moving from $8 to $50 of ODA per capita), estimated infant mortality rates fall from 65.4 to 63.1 per 1,000 live births, while average life expectancies nudge upward slightly, from 60.8 to 61.3 years.
The interaction terms between ICESCR membership and ODA, which appear in the even-numbered models in table 2, all fail to achieve statistical significance. Although ICESCR membership and receipt of ODA independently improve some health indicators, these factors do not combine to affect well-being. Table 3 , which reports the results from our fixed-effects analyses, tells a decidedly less optimistic story from the previous analysis. Here, ICESCR membership and ODA do not influence health outcomes, either singly or in combination. It is instructive to compare our OLS estimates, which do not distinguish "within" and "between" effects, with these fixed-effects results, which isolate withincountry variation. The two sets of findings imply that even though the health profiles of ICESCR parties often compare favorably with those of nonparties, countries that ratify the ICESCR do not themselves experience improved outcomes. In other words, health conditions before and after ICESCR ratification do not differ significantly. Likewise with ODA: countries that receive more development assistance have slightly better health outcomes than countries receiving less assistance, but ODA does not improve recipient countries' internal conditions over time. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tailed). Driscoll-Kraay heteroscedastic-and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors in parentheses. N(country-years) = 2,625; N(countries) = 108. ICESCR = International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; ODA = official development assistance; GDP = gross domestic product. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses. Year-specific intercepts included but not reported. N(country-years) = 2,517; N(countries) = 106. ICESCR = International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; ODA = official development assistance; GDP = gross domestic product.
The effects of control variables generally conform to prior research. GDP per capita improves health outcomes across all models: it lowers infant mortality rates, raises life expectancies, and increases caloric intake. Secondary enrollment ratios also correspond with improved infant mortality rates and overall longevity in the OLS analyses, whereas fertility rates correlate with worse outcomes; in the fixed-effects analyses, these results are confined to infant mortality rates. Life expectancy at birth is about five-and-a-half years lower in the countries of subSaharan Africa, relative to other developing countries. This indicator drops out of the fixed-effects models because it is perfectly collinear with the countryspecific intercepts. Finally, in the OLS analyses, food consumption decreases slightly with democracy and civil war intensity, whereas in the fixed-effects analyses, civil and international war reduce average life expectancies. Tables 4 and 5 repeat the foregoing analyses after substituting DAH for ODA. Our goal is to determine whether targeted aid improves population health more effectively than overall development aid. We also evaluate whether the effectiveness of ICESCR membership is contingent on health-related aid.
ICESCR Membership and Development Assistance for Health
As before, the odd-numbered models consider the independent effects of ICESCR membership and DAH, controlling for other variables. Compared with nonparty states, countries that belong to the ICESCR have lower infant mortality rates and greater caloric intake. As shown in table 4, infant mortality rates are 7.15 per 1,000 births lower for ICESCR parties relative to nonparties, and their daily per capita food consumption is nearly 114 calories greater. However, the independent effects of ICESCR membership disappear in the fixed-effects analyses in table 5. By itself, ratifying the covenant does not improve a country's own health outcomes, even if parties sometimes have better outcomes than nonparties do.
Health aid independently reduces infant mortality rates and boosts life expectancies in the fixed-effects analyses, although the substantive effects are small. Each $1 increase in per capita health aid is associated with a reduction of approximately 23 infant deaths, and increasing per capita health aid by two standard deviations (roughly $15) raises average life expectancy by less than two months. Conversely, DAH corresponds with a very small but statistically significant decline in food consumption in the OLS analysis.
Despite the lackluster independent effects of health aid and ICESCR membership, these factors combine to improve infant mortality and life expectancy in both sets of analyses. Interaction terms can be difficult to interpret, so we plot their effects. Figure 2 uses the pooled OLS results from table 4 to trace the estimated effect of moving from the 1st to the 99th percentile of DAH (i.e., from $0 to $33 per capita) for countries that do and do not belong to the ICESCR, while holding control variables constant at their means. Infant mortality rates fall sharply as DAH increases among ICESCR parties, but the trend is essentially flat for countries that have not ratified the covenant. Estimates from model 2 in table 4 suggest that doubling DAH from its mean (from $4.27 to $8.54 per capita) *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tailed). Driscoll-Kraay heteroscedastic-and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors in parentheses. N(country-years) = 1,559; N(countries) = 111. ICESCR = International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; DAH = development assistance for health; GDP = gross domestic product. reduces the estimated number of infant deaths by approximately 1,340 for parties to the ICESCR but increases infant deaths by 11 for nonparties. DAH is also associated with a slight improvement in life expectancy for ICESCR member countries, but the relationship is negative for countries that have not ratified the covenant. Outcomes for ICESCR parties and nonparties do not differ significantly at low levels of DAH, as indicated by the overlapping confidence intervals. At least a modicum of DAH appears necessary to "activate" the covenant's beneficial health effects. Figure 2 also plots the negative effects of DAH for caloric intake, a relationship that does not differ significantly for parties and nonparties to the ICESCR. Figure 3 uses the fixed-effects estimates from table 5 to plot the marginal effects of DAH on health outcomes for ICESCR parties and nonparties. Health aid significantly reduces infant mortality rates in countries that are party to the ICESCR, but its effect for nonparties is statistically insignificant (as shown by the confidence interval that overlaps with zero). Likewise, the marginal effect of DAH on life expectancy at birth is significantly positive for ICESCR parties, but it is not statistically different from zero for nonparties. These results are telling: not only are health outcomes better for ICESCR parties and DAH recipients, relative to their counterparts, but treaty membership and health aid combine to improve outcomes within countries. As in the corresponding OLS model, the interaction between ICESCR membership and DAH is not statistically significant for daily calories per capita in the fixed-effects analysis.
As for control variables, each health outcome improves with GDP per capita in the OLS analyses. Infant mortality declines with secondary school enrollments. Infant mortality rates and life expectancies deteriorate as fertility rates increase, and these outcomes are worse in sub-Saharan African countries. Civil war increases infant mortality and curtails food consumption; daily calories per capita also decline with democracy and international war. The effects of control variables in the fixed-effects analyses are much sparser: GDP per capita reduces infant mortality and boosts food consumption, infant mortality rates decline with secondary enrollments but increase with fertility rates, and per capita calories decline slightly with democracy.
Is ICESCR Membership or Health Aid Decisive?
By themselves, the interaction effects in tables 4 and 5 lend themselves to two differing interpretations. In one interpretation, health aid moderates the effect of ICESCR membership, such that the covenant is effective only when combined with external assistance. Another interpretation holds that being party to the ICESCR moderates the effect of aid, such that aid improves health conditions only in conjunction with the covenant. The question is whether one variable is decisive while the other serves as "switchman," to use Weber's metaphor. Although it is impossible to say definitively, the results are suggestive.
Consider the fixed-effects analyses. Although health aid independently improves infant mortality rates and life expectancy, being party to the ICESCR does not affect health outcomes in its own right. Thus, DAH does not depend on treaty membership to be effective (even though treaty membership enhances this effect), whereas the ICESCR's impact clearly depends on DAH. These results suggest that DAH gives effect to the ICESCR, rather than the other way around. Health aid makes compliance with the ICESCR possible.
Conversely, the OLS analyses show that ICESCR membership independently reduces infant mortality rates, controlling for DAH and other variables. The coefficient on ICESCR membership remains significantly negative when its interaction with health aid is entered. These findings imply that even among countries that receive no health aid, ICESCR parties outperform nonparties. In contrast, the effects of health aid are confined to ICESCR parties. Here is a case where DAH effects depend on ICESCR membership, but the effect of ICESCR membership is not contingent on DAH (although health aid boosts its effect). Finally, neither ICESCR membership nor DAH independently increases life expectancy; it is only in combination that these factors improve longevity. Moreover, once the interaction term is entered, the main effect of DAH becomes significantly negative: for countries that do not belong to the ICESCR, aid is detrimental to life expectancy. ICESCR membership therefore appears to channel aid effects in opposite directions.
Discussion and Conclusions
Health and well-being in developing countries are topics of global concern. The United Nations, the World Health Organization, and other international agencies seek to reduce infant mortality, increase longevity, and promote overall quality of life around the world. The Sustainable Development Goals, a series of targets adopted by the United Nations in 2015, call on countries to end preventable newborn and child deaths, reduce premature mortality, and eradicate hunger. All 193 UN member countries have agreed to these goals. The difficult task, of course, is to find a way to attain them.
We explored two mechanisms-international human rights law and development assistance-for promoting health in developing countries. We focused on three outcomes: infant mortality rates, life expectancy at birth, and daily calories per capita. Using data for more than 100 non-OECD countries over a 20-to 40-year period, we found some evidence that a core human rights treaty and development assistance improve some fundamental health outcomes. We also showed that these factors tend to be more effective when combined. Table 6 summarizes our main findings and relates these back to the hypotheses that oriented our analyses.
Although parties to the ICESCR often have better health profiles than nonparties do, treaty membership does not affect outcomes within countries. Hypothesis 1, positing the independent salutary effect of treaty membership, finds only partial support. ODA recipients likewise have lower infant mortality rates and higher life expectancies when compared with countries receiving less aid, but ODA does not improve recipients' own outcomes. Nor do ICESCR membership and ODA receipt combine to affect health outcomes, either across or within countries.
We find much stronger effects for health aid. DAH independently lowers infant mortality rates and raises life expectancies at birth. Unlike ODA, the effects of health aid apply to improvements within recipient countries. These findings support Hypothesis 3, regarding the independent salutary effect of aid on health. Our results suggest-perhaps not altogether surprisingly-that health-related aid is more effective than overall development assistance in improving health outcomes. Nevertheless, given recent research finding no effect of DAH on mortality (Wilson 2011 ), this conclusion is notable. Table 5 , model 4
Hypothesis 6 ICESCR = International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; ODA = official development assistance; DAH = development assistance for health; OLS = ordinary leastsquares; FE = fixed effects.
In addition to these independent effects, we identify interaction effects between ICESCR membership and DAH for infant mortality and life expectancy. In conjunction with health aid, being party to the ICESCR explains both between-and within-country variation in these outcomes. Hypothesis 5 finds support, inasmuch as DAH enhances the beneficial effect of ICESCR membership on between-country variation in infant mortality rates. In this case, aid boosts compliance with a human rights treaty that is otherwise difficult to implement.
In support of Hypothesis 6, ICESCR membership steers the effect of DAH on between-country variation in life expectancies in different directions: among treaty parties, DAH raises life expectancy; among nonparties, DAH reduces life expectancy. Also in support of Hypothesis 6, ICESCR membership "activates" the beneficial effects of DAH on within-country improvements in survival outcomes. What appeared to be a significant independent effect of DAH is actually attributable to the effect of health aid among ICESCR parties.
Dependency theories hypothesizing the detrimental effects of aid find almost no support in our analysis. In only one case-the impact of DAH on betweencountry variation in per capita calories consumed-did we find a statistically significant perverse effect. This finding, however, is substantively very small. Hypotheses 2 and 4, which predicted that ICESCR membership and development aid, respectively, would have no meaningful impact on health outcomes, find support primarily with respect to food consumption. On this front, the pattern of effects we observe across health outcomes is noteworthy. Our strongest findings pertain to infant mortality rates. These rates are generally highest among the poorest segments of society (Brady, Beckfield, and Zhao 2007; Houweling et al. 2005 ). Infant mortality is more sensitive than other health outcomes to economic conditions (Mishra and Newhouse 2009; Pritchett and Summers 1996) , and also, we conclude, to human rights treaty commitments and development assistance.
Conversely, our analyses uncovered few effects for caloric consumption, a common metric of food supply and hunger. Whereas infant mortality rates are typically highest among impoverished or disadvantaged populations, per capita caloric intake is more likely skewed toward affluent groups. Calories are more readily "monopolized" by affluent segments of the population. Jenkins and Scanlan (2001) , for instance, demonstrated that increased food supply-measured as caloric intake-does not reduce the incidence of child hunger in developing countries. Hunger and malnutrition do not necessarily reflect a lack of food in absolute terms; the problem, rather, is that available food fails to reach those in direst need.
We conclude that human rights commitments and targeted financial assistance intersect to alleviate, and even improve, at least some basic health outcomes in developing countries, particularly those that disproportionately afflict disadvantaged groups. Our analyses suggest clear policy implications. If the goal is to improve health conditions among the poor, then donor countries should provide DAH to countries that have ratified the ICESCR. Future research may identify additional synergies between the international human rights and development regimes, not only for population health but also for a variety of socioeconomic outcomes. Given the promise of our findings and the nature of the stakes involved, more research is clearly warranted.
Notes
